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We test core theories of the household using variants of a public good game and 
experimental data from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses do not maximise 
surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge. 
This violates assumptions of unitary and cooperative models. When women control 
the common account, they receive less than when men control it; this contradicts 
standard bargaining models. Women contribute less than men and are rewarded more 
generously by men than vice versa. This casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990). We 
also find strong evidence for opportunism. The results are put in a socioeconomic 
context using survey data and follow-up interviews, which provides hints of the 
external validity of our findings; more so for contribution than for allocation 
behaviour. Taken together, our findings suggest that a ‘one-size fits all’ model of the 
household is unlikely to be satisfactory. 
21. Introduction
Experimental economics has acquired a reputation for testing directly the 
assumptions of economic models. Yet while aspects of the subject, such as individual 
choice, have been addressed by a steady stream of experiments, there is a scarcity of 
experimental work within economics on household decision making.1 This is all the 
more surprising given that most humans live and make decisions within households. 
The paucity of experimental research on household decision-making is not 
compensated by a profusion of insightful market or survey data. Much information is 
only  available at the household level,  making inference  about intra-household 
behaviour problematic, though not impossible. For instance, results on aggregate data 
typically  repudiate   the   unitary   model   in   which   household  members   act  as   if 
maximizing a single set of preferences (e.g. Alderman et al, 1995, Browning and 
Chiappori, 1998, Lundberg et al, 1997). However, such aggregate data are less useful 
for   identifying  the  more   appropriate   among  competing  household  models  and 
clarifying the micro-structure of household decisions. 
Experiments offer novel opportunities to test the causes of the failure of the 
unitary model and for comparing the performance of alternative household theories. 
In short, experimental data provide a way around the problem that different household 
models often produce identical reduced form expressions and predictions, making the 
1 Three exceptions discussed below are Peters et al (2004), Bateman and Munro (2003) and Ashraf 
(2005).
3models indistinguishable using available non-experimental data.2 
At the same time, experiments involving married couples are fundamentally 
different from those with anonymous play between strangers, since couples care more 
about each other’s well-being, interact repeatedly and are better placed for making 
conjectures about each other’s behaviour. Experiments involving spouses therefore 
have their own methodological hazards, created by differences between actual 
contexts and formal household theories.3 
We tackle these methodological issues using a suite of variants on classical 
public good games and a sample of married couples from Uganda to conduct the first 
experimental test of the assumptions and predictions of several classes of household 
models. Our experiment, discussed in more detail below, generates tests of surplus 
maximization, the influence of endowments and control on individual payoffs, and 
opportunism. Furthermore we obtain evidence on the sharing rules that female and 
male spouses implement.4
2  There is a shortage of empirical work testing the performance of  alternative  theories of the 
household.  See Folbre (1984) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1984) for an early debate on predictions, 
and Senauer et al (1988) on the issue of identical reduced form expressions. See also Haddad et al 
(1997).  
33 The repeated nature of real-world interactions implies that some actions within the experiment may 
be undone by subsequent behaviour. To make robust inferences it is therefore important to have acts 
which   cannot   be   wholly   undone   by   subsequent   and   unobserved   transfers   between   partners. 
Furthermore, since decisions within the experiment are likely to be influenced by equilibrium 
household behaviour outside the laboratory, it is valuable to have socio-economic data on likely 
correlates of the actions that do take place under the gaze of the experimenters.
4 In a world of certainty, a game played between husband and wife may generate an allocation as its 
equilibrium prediction. When uncertainty is present, this household equilibrium may be a sharing rule 
– a mapping from the set of possible incomes for each partner to the allocation of that income to its 
different uses (Ligon 2002). Different sharing rules may support or undermine efficiency in the 
4Our main results can be summarized thus: surplus maximization is decisively 
rejected, while the identity of the decision-maker matters for efficiency - a greater 
proportion of the surplus is realised when women are in charge of the common 
account. These findings violate crucial assumptions of unitary models and cooperative 
models. Moreover, when women control the common account, they receive less than 
when men control it; and vice versa. This contradicts all standard bargaining models. 
Intriguingly, women’s contributions are rewarded more generously by men than vice 
versa, and women contribute less to the household account than men do. This casts 
doubt on Sen’s (1990) postulates of the undervaluation of female contributions and a 
female tendency to identify more closely with household interests, although to be fair 
he does not claim that these would hold in all contexts. Finally, we find strong 
evidence for opportunism – the tendency to hide initial endowments from one’s 
partner even when one is in charge of the common account.
For the purpose of gaining insights into the external validity of these findings, 
we place our results in a socioeconomic context using data from an exit survey that 
covered all couples who participated in the experiments and in-depth follow-up 
interviews with 51 couples. Using the former, we find strong support for socio-
economic effects on contribution behaviour in the experiments. From the latter we 
obtain some evidence that game allocation behaviour mirrors roughly analogous 
household. Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1995) review the limited evidence on sharing rules, suggesting 
that alongside efficiency concerns, norms of fairness and equity play a role in their determination.
5normal-life decision making. 
In Section 2 the main classes of household models and the predictions we 
focus on are introduced. Section 3 presents our experimental design in terms of tests 
of hypotheses implied by these models. Section 4 reports on the research sites, and on 
the implementation of the experiments. Section 5 presents univariate and bivariate 
tests of our hypotheses and Section 6 examines the socio-economic context and 
reflects on the implications. Section 7 concludes.
62. Background and motivation
Most formal models of household behaviour can be classified under the 
rubrics  unitary,   Pareto-efficient  or  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  models 
(Alderman et al. 1995, Haddad et al. 1997). In the unitary approach (Samuelson 1956, 
Becker 1991), the household is modelled as a single agent with a unified set of 
preferences: all income is therefore pooled and the identity of the income recipient 
does not affect household decisions.  The key feature of cooperative models (McElroy 
and Horney 1981, Manser and Brown 1980) is the assumption of Pareto efficiency, 
usually within a context of bargaining where power depends on ‘threat-points’ and 
control of the allocation. Empirically, therefore, a key difference between unitary and 
cooperative models is that in the latter, the identity of the individual controlling 
resources affects decisions, with individual rewards increasing in the share of 
household resources.  5 Meanwhile, in non-cooperative models (Ulph 1988, Woolley 
1988), household members make their contributions to household public goods 
separately in the standard format of a non-cooperative game. Efficiency is not a 
prediction of static, non-cooperative models, but income pooling can be - so that 
individual rewards may or may not be increasing in the individual shares of household 
income. 
5 Basu (2006) shows that this relationship runs both ways, and that household decisions may also affect 
the balance of power, but that the effect of, say, female labour force participation is not instantaneous. 
In a dynamic perspective, spouses will tend to behave strategically which may result in inefficiency 
also within so-called collective models.    
7A number of models step beyond this simple classification, such as Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993)’s separate-spheres theory and Sen’s (1990) cooperative conflict 
model, an influential hybrid theory tailored for developing country contexts. In the 
latter, the perceived interests and perceived contributions of a household member also 
affect intra-household distribution. In particular he postulates that women identify 
more closely than men with the household’s interests and should be expected to invest 
more, but these female contributions also tend to be undervalued. This undervaluation 
will ‘vary from one society to another’ with its effect being ‘more regressive for 
women in some societies’ (1990: 137).
Early empirical tests focused on the income pooling assumption in unitary 
models and the notion that intrahousehold allocations are independent of the identity 
of the person earning income or controlling an asset (e.g. Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990, 
Browning et al, 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). These studies found a strong 
impact of gender identity on labour supply and on the health outcomes of children, 
thus rejecting the pooling assumption. Meanwhile, Phipps et al. (1998) suggest that 
husbands and wives pool incomes for some but not other categories of consumption.6 
While the evidence against the unitary model is fairly consistent, that for cooperative 
models is less clear-cut. Browning and Chiappori (1998) conclude in favour of Pareto 
efficiency, while Jones’ (1983) research for Cameroon and Udry’s (1996) analysis of 
the multi-plot farming systems in Burkina Faso cast doubt on the empirical soundness 
6 See also Duflo and Udry (2004).
8of the Pareto efficiency assumption.7  
There are a small number of recognisably economic experiments on household 
decision-making. In common with the non-experimental literature, the results of these 
papers reject the unitary model. Using a common pool game with a voluntary 
contribution mechanism, Peters et al. (2004) compare free-riding behaviour among 
household   members   with   a   control   group   of   strangers   in   the   USA   and   find 
contributions within family groups to be higher and reductions over time weaker.8 In 
Peters et al.’s samples, many family groups were missing one or more of their adult 
members, but typically include children in the game. In contrast, Bateman and Munro 
(2003) use only couples. Using data from a series of incentivised choices, they reject 
Pareto-efficiency, income pooling and the unitary model for their sample of UK 
households, but do not quantify the inefficiency they observe. Finally, in Ashraf’s 
(2005) study of saving and consumption decisions in the Philippines, individual 
spouses receive an endowment that must be invested in a joint account,  in a private 
account or taken as a private gift certificate subject to alternative experimental 
conditions. She does not test directly income pooling or efficiency, but she finds 
men’s saving behaviour to be strategic and responsive to whether information about 
endowments,   payoffs   and   behaviour   is   private   or   public,   and   to   whether 
7 Using data from Ghana, Goldstein and Udry (2008; 15) reconsider Udry’s (1996) findings and 
suggest that within household dispersion in yields on similar plots may be caused by the land tenure 
system.    
8 Frolich et al (2004) argue that adding social context and familiarity to an anonymous experimental 
setting tends to increase contributions and reduce free-riding behaviour. 
9communication is allowed. Women’s behaviour, in contrast, is largely invariant to 
changes in the experimental conditions. 
In short, therefore, none of the preceding experiments provide a quantitative 
test of household efficiency or income pooling on a proper sample of couples using an 
incentive compatible design. Our design overcomes these deficiencies, examines 
hypotheses associated with Sen’s theory and tests for household sharing rules. 
13. Design
As we noted above, experiments on households are rare and present new 
challenges to experimental methodology. As such it is worth setting up a general 
theoretical framework for household decisions, before introducing the specifics of our 
design.
Let there be H members of the household. Endowments are E (a vector) and 
prices are p. We will refer to the first H elements of E as income, denoted Ek, k=1,…
,H with corresponding prices normalised to 1. C(E,p) is the feasible set, typical 
members of which are c, a vector (typical element ci) listing the consumption, 
including supply and time use of each household member . Preferences are defined 
over c. The within-household allocation is a vector c*  C. A sharing rule or ε  
equivalently an allocation rule is a mapping from (E,p) to c*. A disturbance is defined 
as a perturbation of (E,p). We say a disturbance is neutral if C  = C(E ,p ) = ′ ′ ′  
C(E,p) and we say that C’ dominates C if C is a subset of C’ and ∀c   C,  ε ∃c’  C’ ε  
such that c<c’.9 
Different theories of the household represent different notions about the 
properties of the sharing rule and, in particular, how disturbances affect consumption 
patterns. Each sharing rule may have many properties, some of which can be common 
to a variety of different theories of the household.  For instance, a household sharing 
rule satisfies the principle of monotonicity if when C’ dominates C, c*’ is weakly 
9 By c<c’. we mean ci  c ≤ i’ with at least one i such that ci < ci’.
1preferred to c* by each member of the household and for at least one person c*’ is 
strictly preferred to c*.
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Similarly, the sharing rule satisfies Pareto efficiency if ∀C, there is no c   C with c ε  
 c* such that c is Pareto preferred to c*. ≠
Acts are interim decisions made by household members that do not directly 
affect preferences. As such acts represent a particular class of disturbances.  They 
may include transfers or temporary within-household loans of liquidity. More broadly 
they are any decisions made by members of the household that a) can affect 
endowments (and possibly prices) and b) do not affect preferences. Thus if a 
household member obtains a warm glow from making a transfer then this would not 
be considered an act. For the purposes of what follows it will be useful to distinguish 
between investment acts, which we denote by x, and acts of reallocation which we 
label z. Generally we write the consumption set as C(E,p,x,z). Some acts will affect 
the possible consumption set, but others will be neutral disturbances – for instance a 
transfer of money between partners that could be reversed prior to any acts of 
consumption expenditure. This latter class of acts we term reversible. 10
10  Whether an act is reversible will depend both on the type of act and the set of acts that are 
subsequently feasible. For instance, suppose £10 is transferred to a child just as they depart on a bus. If 
there are no subsequent opportunities for repaying the money or for reallocating responsibilities for 
1Experiments on households typically fit the definition of a disturbance, 
because they alter the endowments and prices faced by households rather than 
consumption directly (though this is in theory possible). Typically the behaviour 
observed in experiments also represents interim acts rather than final consumption 
behaviour. Thus in order to have tests of theories of household behaviour we need to 
make links between observed acts and theoretical predictions about consumption. For 
acts that are not reversible we use the principle of monotonicity as the linking 
assumption.11 
Suppose for instance, we observe acts x, z, some parts of which are non-
reversible such that C(E,p,x,z) is dominated by C(E,p,x*,z*) where the acts x* and z* 
are also feasible. By the principle of monotonicity, the household is not Pareto 
efficient in its actions.   
Consider two treatments that produce two different endowments (E,p) and 
(E’,p) with the difference between them satisfying properties (1)–(3) stated in the 
definition of income pooling. Suppose in one treatment we observe acts x and z with 
x’ and z’ in the second. If C’ = C(E’,p,x’,z’) dominates C = C(E,p,x,z) then as long as 
the principle of monotonicity holds, the property of income pooling fails. 
expenditure then the transfer can be irreversible.
11 The principle of monotonicity is an assumption made implicitly in most experiments on individual 
choice where subjects receive rewards in cash that are not then consumed in the presence of the 
experimenter. 
1Although one might not trust reversible behaviour observed in an experiment 
to the same degree as that attached to irreversible acts, nevertheless it may be unwise 
to dismiss it entirely. It is clear though that when acts are reversible, no firm 
inferences   can   be   made   about   household   theories   in   the   absence   of   further 
assumptions. One such assumption is the ‘principle of face value’ – i.e. that behaviour 
observed in the laboratory is not affected by the fact that it takes place in an artificial 
context and under the watchful eyes of researchers.  On the whole, many experimental 
economists have been rightly sceptical about taking behaviour at face value with 
Levitt and List (2007) as a notable critique in this line of thinking. 
In Levitt and List’s (2007) organising model, experimental subjects place 
weight on their monetary payoffs and on being moral. When scrutiny of their actions 
is higher they are more likely to behave morally.  Similarly when stakes are relatively 
low, a greater weight may be placed on moral acts. If we take this model and apply it 
specifically to the issue of reversible acts, then it has three predictions. Firstly, acts 
which are moral will receive greater weight in a laboratory setting than in real 
contexts.  Secondly, differences  in behaviour  between groups  (e.g. men versus 
women) with equal scrutiny may either be the result of differences in underlying 
preferences or due to differences in the response to scrutiny. Thirdly, when comparing 
behaviour between two treatments with equal scrutiny, the signs of differences 
between acts are unaffected by the level of the scrutiny. 
1The vehicle for our hypothesis tests is the following set of variants of a two-
person game with four stages. At stage 1, each spouse i is endowed with endowment 
Ei, where E1+E2 = 4000 and Ei   {0,2000,4000}. In the second stage she or he makes ε  
a contribution of xi  (0   x ≤ i   E ≤ i) to a common pool. In the third stage total 
contributions are multiplied by 1.5 and in the final stage either one individual decides 
on the allocation of the common pool or the pool is split 50:50. The payout to 
individual i is zi so that an individual’s monetary payoff is Ei – xi + zi while the total 
value of the pool is y (= 1.5(x1+x2) = z1 + z2). In terms of our general theoretical 
framework, the x acts are not reversible, since any money that is not invested cannot 
be recovered at a later stage. Conversely, the z acts are transfers that may be undone 
(at least in theory) after the experiment. Hence they fit the definition of reversible 
acts. 
There are nine possible variants of the game and they are summarised in Table 
1. Cells lower in the table represent variants with larger female endowments while 
cells to the right represent variants with greater female control over the division of the 
common pool. The 50:50 variants are common pool games. Variants where one 
person has the entire endowment, while also controlling the allocation, are dictator 
games, whereas variants where the identity of the investing individual and the 
allocating individual differ are games of trust.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
1In table 1, two of the variant cells do not contain numbers. These are dictator 
games that were omitted from the final design because of the lack of interaction 
between partners and our desire to examine issues of trust. The numbers listed in the 
other cells label the variants used in the experiment. Two cells contain two numbers 
because these variants were conducted in both study sites.
Let us now  consider   the  predictions  in  Table 2  where   the  numbering 
corresponds with the tests we propose. In line with the framework presented above, 
we divide hypotheses into two groups, concerning acts which are in turn irreversible 
and reversible. Our design provides firm evidence for the former group. For the latter 
group, the evidence provides suggestive material which we interpret in the light of 
Levitt and List’s (2007) organising model. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In all variants of the game, total surplus maximization (I) implies that each 
player should set xi = Ei. The null hypothesis that efficiency is independent of the 
identity of the allocator (II) can be tested for by comparing total contributions, i.e. x1 + 
x2, in the games with female and male control in each of the two sites, i.e. 3 with 5 
and 8 with 9. The hypothesis that control raises payoffs (III) implies that Ei – xi + zi 
should be higher with control than without. Alternatively, since one agent has no 
control over their partner’s contribution we test the hypothesis that zi/y is higher with 
control, when i is in control of the allocation,  by comparing behaviour in variant 2 
1with 6, 3 with 5 and 8 with 9. Meanwhile, the hypothesis that endowment raises 
payoffs (IV) implies that Ei – xi + zi  should increase with Ei and can be tested by 
comparing behaviour in variant 2 (female control, zero female endowment) with 5 
(female   control,   equal   endowments)   and   behaviour   in   3   (male   control,   equal 
endowments) with 6 (male control, zero male endowment). 
12
We define the degree of reciprocity, or contribution-based sharing, as the 
responsiveness of the allocation of the common account by one spouse to the 
contribution made by the partner. We are able to test the null hypothesis that 
reciprocity is zero (V) in variants 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9. In the same variants gender 
differences in contribution-based rewards, and in particular a potential undervaluation 
of female contributions (VI), may be detected. Meanwhile if a household sharing rule 
exists then the responsiveness of men to female contributions should be equal to the 
responsiveness of women to male contributions. 
12 This test mixes the x and z variables. We place it in the reversible group, while noting that the x 
choices cannot be undone.  
1If   women   anticipate,   correctly   or   not,   that   their   contributions   will   be 
undervalued, they may contribute less to the common pool than men even if they 
would have contributed more had they anticipated that their contributions would be 
valued equally. The only clear indication of an intrinsic female preference for 
contributing to the common pool (VII) is therefore provided in the variants in which 
the sharing rule is fixed (50:50 split of the common pool), by comparing male with 
female behaviour in variants 1 and 7, respectively, as well as in 4.
In all the games, the private endowment Ei was known only to individual i. 
The common account and the final allocation from that account was common 
knowledge. In the {4,000: 0} games both partners were told that one of them received 
nothing, and the other some amount between zero and 4,000 Ugandan shillings. 
Meanwhile, in the {2,000: 2,000} games both partners were told that they received 
some, potentially different amounts between 100 and 4,000 shillings.
We did not reveal full information about each individual’s endowment, in part 
as a response to ethical concerns about the creation of family disputes if all 
information was revealed. Theories of household behaviour have had little to say on 
the impact of asymmetric information on outcomes, despite the widespread evidence 
of its presence within the household (e.g. Pahl 1990, Woolley 2000). Indeed, in 
follow-up interviews with 51 couples that participated in our experiments, we find 
1imperfect knowledge of spousal finances to be common, at least in wives’ accounts.13 
A total surplus maximizer has no incentive to withhold contributions, even with 
asymmetric information. Other types of players may wish to hide some or all of their 
endowment from their partner. In the experiment, they could achieve this by not 
placing it in the common pool, but because there are other motives for not investing 
which would apply even if endowments were common knowledge, we cannot simply 
interpret all failures to invest as evidence of attempted deception. For instance a 
selfish player in variants 1, 4 or 7 (with 50:50 split) may not invest any sum because 
the net private return to a common pool investment would be negative. The clearest 
evidence of attempts to deceive is therefore provided in variants where the potential 
investor also controls the allocation. In this context we measure opportunism as the 
difference Ei – xi in games where player i has Ei > 0 and is the allocator. In variants 3, 
5, 8 and 9, we test the null hypothesis that opportunism is zero (VIII).
4. Context 
Research sites
Bufumbo sub-county and Sironko District are on the slopes of Mt Elgon in 
south eastern Uganda. This is a densely settled area with an average population 
density of 284 per km2 and average farm size of 1.4-1.5 ha and rainfall of about 
13 72 percent of men claim full knowledge of wives’ finances, and 92 percent that their wives fully 
know theirs. In wives’ accounts these figures are startlingly different: 21 and 14 percent, respectively. 
11186mm (Wakamire 2001). Livelihoods are predominantly agricultural, but still 
complex and diverse with overlapping production units engaged in crop production, 
livestock rearing, labouring, petty trading and services, and both joint and individual 
enterprises are pursued by household members. Both districts have mainly fertile 
volcanic loams but Sironko is flat, low-lying and has a greater proportion of sandy 
loam soils suited for maize, beans, soya, groundnuts and sunflower cultivation. Its 
nucleated centre has more diverse non farming livelihoods, better housing and 
infrastructure, including electricity, than its outer villages. Bufumbo is higher, wetter, 
poorer and hillier than Sironko and lacks electricity. 
We chose to locate the experiments in these two areas partly because of the 
expectation that we would see distinctive forms of conjugality determined by the 
predominantly Christian nature of Sironko and the Muslim character of Bufumbo. 
However, on closer inspection we formed the impression that other differences such 
as in cropping patterns, and therefore gender divisions of labour, are possibly more 
likely to explain the variations between the two sites in gender relations. Bananas and 
coffee dominate the upland Bufumbo farming system, and maize and beans the 
lowland Sironko farming system. The gender division of labour is likely to be very 
different in each location, with a lower level of women’s labour involved in perennial 
coffee and banana, and a more sex segregated pattern of labour and control, and a 
higher level of more sex sequential operations in maize and bean cultivation.14  
14 See Whitehead (1985). Elements of agricultural production may be gendered at the level of the whole 
crop, i.e. sex segregated, or through interdigitated processes in a single enterprise, i.e. sex sequential 
2Most residents of Sironko and Bufumbo are Bagisu, a group known for very 
high levels of violence which is predominantly within kin groups, perpetrated by men 
on other men, and closely linked to accusations of thieving and witchcraft (Heald 
1998, Roscoe 1924, La Fontaine 1959). According to Heald (1998), this is driven by 
intense conflict over access to resources, and gender ideals of male provider roles 
which are increasingly difficult for men to fulfil. Her emphasis on the absence of trust 
between male kin is echoed in broader research on comparative social capital, in 
which the district emerges as having extremely low levels of expressed trust, low 
levels of voluntary activity, and a low social capital index compared to seven other 
Ugandan locations (Widner and Mundt 1998).
If kinship, for men, is infused with mistrust, marriage is a comparative haven 
of trust despite the instability of marriage amongst the Gisu. Gender relations are 
expressed formally in terms of absolute male control, but in reality women have 
considerable freedom to marry whom they choose, divorce and remarry readily when 
marriage is unsatisfactory, and generally exercise the power that comes from men’s 
dependence on marriage for managing their reputations, and achievement of an 
important   element   of   adult   masculinity.   The   marital   histories   of   51   couples 
interviewed in some depth in the weeks after the experiments show that the great 
majority of divorces are initiated by wives. Also, very few men said they had thought 
about divorcing their current spouses but 74 percent of women said they had, and 
(e.g. maize where men plough, women plant, women weed, both sexes harvest, women process and 
men market).
2whilst 23 percent of women reckoned they could be better off unmarried, only 4 
percent of men entertained similar thoughts. Marital failure has very dramatic 
consequences for men, and may be fatal, since bachelors and divorced men are 
socially ridiculed, suspected of sorcery and theft, and ultimately sanctioned with 
violence (Heald 1998). 
Implementation of the experiments
The experiments in Sironko took place on consecutive days in March 2005 
with experiments implemented in Bufumbo on the following day. The venues were a 
multi-purpose   village   hall   (Sironko)   and   the   headquarters   of   the   sub-county 
(Bufumbo). LC1 chairmen (leaders of a village council) were approached two weeks 
beforehand and asked to mobilise couples that had taken part in a previous household 
survey. In addition they were asked to recruit additional (co-habiting) married couples 
to make up the required number for the experiments.
One game was played at the time and the only people present in the hall were 
couples playing that game and the game organisers. Instructions and examples took 
approximately 30 minutes on average. The local game organisers are well-qualified 
for implementing experiments even of considerably greater complexity than the one 
on which we report here (Humphrey and Verschoor 2004; Mosley and Verschoor 
2005) and were satisfied with subjects’ understanding of the game. Indeed, in 
spontaneously offered feedback immediately after the game and in the follow-up 
2interviews, no respondent said they had found the game unclear or confusing. Each 
spouse received an envelope after the game had been explained and demonstrated. 
The contents of the envelope were such that any multiple of 100 shillings could be left 
in it. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate to the pound was approximately 
2,850 Ugandan shillings, and to the US dollar 1,730. A typical agricultural daily wage 
was between 1,000 and 1,500 shillings for women and between 1,500 and 2,000 for 
men. The range of possible couples’ total payoffs of between 4,000 and 6,000 
shillings thus provided substantial incentives.
Secrecy was ensured by calling one couple at a time with the husband going to 
one corner of the hall and his wife to the other; each spouse removed from their 
envelope what they wanted to keep for themselves, with the remainder left for the 
common account. A helper then collected their envelopes and recorded the decisions. 
Collusion within a single game was avoided by a threat of exclusion (which proved to 
be highly effective); collusion between games on the same day was avoided by 
keeping waiting groups apart in a school (Sironko) or separately on the grass 
(Bufumbo). Collusion across days (relevant for Sironko only) was mitigated by 
playing the unequal-endowment games on the first day and the equal-endowment 
games the next day. 
5. Results
We first present an overview of the basic results, with simple univariate and 
2bivariate hypotheses tests. In line with the theoretical framework introduced in 
Section 3, we distinguish between irreversible findings and those that are, at least in 
principle, reversible. Findings 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 are in this terminology irreversible 
since they relate exclusively to contribution behaviour: a failure to contribute the 
entire endowment to the common pool represents an efficiency loss that cannot be 
recovered subsequent to the experiment. Findings 5, 6 and 8 relate at least in part to 
allocation   behaviour   and   are   thus   termed   reversible.   Since   post-experiment 
compensating transfers, reneging on normal spending responsibilities, and so forth 
cannot be ruled out, it follows that scrutiny by the experimenters would affect 
subjects’ allocation decisions, which can be reversed for the reasons mentioned, more 
than their contribution decisions, and generalizability of the former type of decisions 
is more problematic (cf. Levitt and List, 2007). The issue of external validity is 
tackled in the next section. Using the linking assumption that socio-economic 
characteristics are orthogonal to response to scrutiny in the experiments, we present 
evidence on the extent to which both contribution and allocation decisions are 
predicted and mirrored by contextual variables.
Tests of surplus maximisation (I)
Finding 1: Surplus maximisation is rejected
Table 3 and the accompanying figure 1 give an overview of the results from 
the 240 couples (49 from Bufumbo, 191 from Sironko). In the table, the columns 
2headed ‘Female x/E’ and ‘Male x/E’ give the mean fraction of endowments invested 
by women and men respectively. The next two columns show mean payoffs 
(including the portion of the endowment not invested). Mean y/max y is the fraction 
of   the   total   available   surplus   which   is   generated   by   the   household   with   the 
accompanying sample standard deviation in the adjoining column. The final column 
reports a t-test for the null hypothesis that households maximize total surplus. This 
null hypothesis is decisively rejected in all variants. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Finding 2: For the equivalent variants, total contributions are higher in 
Sironko than in Bufumbo.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total surplus, measured as a fraction of the 
potential total for the 9 different variants. Reinforcing the message of Table 3, there 
are   compelling   contrasts   between   the   variants,   but   in   a   narrow   majority   of 
observations the total surplus is not realised. However, in all variants except 8 and 9 
(the Bufumbo variants) the modal surplus is 1, and in variants 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 the 
median surplus is 1. Overall, in Sironko a clear majority of couples (56.5%) maximize 
total surplus, but in Bufumbo no couple realises more than 90% of the total surplus. 
Using a two-sided, unequal variances t-test we examine the null hypothesis that 
2location makes no difference to the surplus generated, by comparing outcomes in 
games 8 and 9 with 3 and 5 respectively. In both comparisons the null hypothesis is 
rejected with p values of 0.0050 and 0.0004 respectively. In short therefore, the 
realisation of cooperative potential and thus the size of efficiency losses in the two 
locations are very different and this is one of the major lessons of our paper. 
Tests of control and efficiency (II)
Finding 3: A fixed sharing rule does not alter contribution levels
We test whether control of the allocation of the common pool makes a 
difference to contribution levels in two ways. First we compare variants with a 50:50 
split to ones where one partner controls the allocation. There are four comparisons of 
this kind (see Table 4) and the tests are two-sided since there are arguments on both 
sides about how transferring control (decision-making power) might impact on 
contributions. In this table ‘Mean y/max y’ is the fraction of the total available surplus 
realised in the game. Results for the test (the t-statistic and below it the associated 
probability value) are given in the final column of the table.  In general the null is not 
rejected.15
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Finding   4:   When   women   control   allocation   both   male   and   female 
15  Whether a fixed sharing rule outperforms discretionary allocations by spouses with regard to 
efficiency is likely to depend on the chosen sharing rule. In terms of incentive provision, the adopted 
50/50 split is a primitive rule; even so Sironko spouses fail to outperform the 50/50 split. 
2contributions are higher
Secondly we compare levels of contribution in the variants where the man 
controls the allocation of the common pool to levels of contribution in variants where 
the woman makes the decision (see the second part of Table 4). Again the test is two-
sided. The null (hypothesis II) is rejected at the 5% level in Sironko and rejected at 
the 10% level in Bufumbo. In both sites, total surplus is higher when women control 
the allocation (games 5 and 9).
Obviously total contribution is the sum of the contributions by the two 
partners, so we can dig deeper by analysing the impact of control on individual 
contributions. Table 5 summarises the six comparisons, four of which involve variants 
in which both partners received endowments and two where one partner received the 
entire endowment. 
2The column headed ‘Mean x’ shows mean contribution levels, x, by gender for 
the relevant variants. The adjacent column shows respectively the t statistic and 
probability value for a two tailed independent samples test that the mean values of x 
are the same in each pair of variants being compared. For each comparison, wives 
control the allocation for the second variant listed and in each case female control 
leads to higher contribution by both sexes. In short, both men and women invest more 
when women are in charge of the allocation. In one case (women in Bufumbo) the 
difference between games is significant at the 1% level. In two other cases it is 
significant at the 10% level with a two sided test. 
Test of control and payoff share (III)
The final two columns depict the fraction of the final payoff received by each 
gender and then the mean payoff. The asterisks indicate significant differences at 
standard significance levels, but to save space the values of the t-statistic and 
associated p values are not reported. A common pattern emerges: contrary to 
predictions of standard bargaining models and hypothesis III,  greater  control is 
associated with the receipt of a lower fraction of total payoffs and simultaneously a 
lower absolute level of payoff.  
TABLE 5 HERE.
Tests of the impacts of endowments on payoffs (IV)
2Finding 5: While allocations made by men vary with changes in endowments, 
female allocations do not.
Above we found that decision-making power or control was not associated 
with higher payoffs. We now turn the attention to another potential source of power, 
namely that associated with resource control or endowments. To identify the effect of 
initial endowments on total receipts from the game when the same spouse decides the 
split, female receipts in games 2 and 5 are compared and male receipts in games 3 and 
6 (i.e. in Sironko only).  In games 5 and 2 the allocation is decided by the wife and 
female endowments are 2000 and 0 respectively. The corresponding mean receipts for 
women are 2832 and 2532. In games 3 and 6 the husband controls the allocation and 
male endowments are 2000 and 0 respectively. The corresponding mean receipts for 
men are 2318 and 1119. The observed difference is significant only for husbands in 
games 3 and 6 (p-value 0.01). Hence, while male allocators respond to endowment 
changes in accordance with theoretical predictions, the response by female allocators 
is not significantly different from zero.
Tests of contribution-based sharing (reciprocity) (V)
Finding 6: We find evidence for male reciprocity in Sironko, but not in 
Bufumbo and no evidence for female reciprocity
For the relevant variants figure 2 summarises the extent to which spouses 
2repay the contribution of their partners. It plots the allocation to the non-controlling 
spouse against individual contribution levels together with lines of best fit. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The fitted lines, estimated using OLS, are summarised in table 6. While the 
lines   are   upwards   sloping   (suggesting   positive   responses   to   the   partner’s 
contribution), the statistical conclusions are weaker. In general, we conclude in favour 
of male reciprocity in Sironko (i.e. games 3 and 6), but find no evidence of similar 
behaviour among female allocators. It is also unclear whether there is a net return for 
the investors, i.e. whether the slopes are greater than 1.  The implications for theories 
of household behaviour are intriguing and suggest the absence of household-level 
contribution-based sharing rules. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Tests  of  gender   differences   in  contributions   and  relative  valuations   of 
contributions (VI and VII)
Finding 7: We find no evidence that women contribute more to the common 
pool than men do
For the variants in which the sharing rule is fixed, so that contributions cannot 
be interpreted as being influenced by expectations of the spouse’s generosity, we find 
no statistically significant differences in contribution levels (Table 7). 
3TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Finding   8a):   In   Sironko,   male   allocators   contribute   more   and   award 
themselves less than their wives, while female allocators contribute less and award 
themselves the same as their husbands.
In other comparisons using observations on female and male contributions and 
payoffs in table 5, the results are more nuanced. Again we do not find support for the 
unconditional hypothesis of greater female contributions. In game 3 where men 
control the allocation, women receive more than men (p=0.07, one tailed t-test) while 
contributing less (p=0.04, one tailed t-test). In game 5, when Sironko women have 
control, women continue to contribute less than men – this difference is again 
statistically significant (p=0.049, one-tailed t-test). At the same time the receipts from 
the game for the two spouses are indistinguishable. 
Finding 8b): In Bufumbo, male allocators contribute the same and award 
themselves the same as their wives, while female allocators contribute more and 
award themselves the same as their husbands.      
Turning to Bufumbo, women contribute slightly less and receive more than 
men when men are in control, but neither of these differences is statistically 
significant. With female control men receive more from the game than women and 
contribute less, with only the latter being statistically significant (p=0.035, one-tailed 
3t-test). It would thus seem that Sen’s concepts of perceived interests and contributions 
perform rather poorly, especially in Sironko but also in Bufumbo. Inequality in these 
variants is driven not by exploitation of the spouse by the party in control – but rather 
by generosity by the spouse in control vis-à-vis the partner. Where inequality in 
receipts emerges, more power thus has the opposite effect of what most theories 
would predict.    
Test of opportunism (VIII)
Finding 9: The null of no opportunism is rejected
We can also use Table 5 to test for opportunism. If there is no opportunism, 
the value of mean x for male players in games 3 and 8 should equal 2000, as should 
the value of mean x for female players in games 5 and 9. In all cases the null 
hypothesis is rejected, with p values of 0.000. In other words, participants routinely 
keep back some of their endowments even when they control the allocation.
6. Socio-economic effects
In this section we obtain some clues about the external validity of the findings 
presented above by contextualising contribution and allocation decisions using socio-
economic characteristics for all subjects from an exit survey and, for 36 couples only, 
from follow-up interviews.16  The presence of socio-economic effects is taken as 
evidence for external validity but at the same time, and as noted above, we expect 
16 The relevant variables could not be constructed for the remaining 15 couples that were interviewed.
3allocation more than contribution behaviour to be affected by issues that may limit 
external validity.17 
Tables 8 and 9 respectively regress contribution and allocation rates on a set of 
socio-economic characteristics and game dummies.18 The sign, size and significance 
of the coefficients on the game dummies are consistent with the tests reported on in 
the previous section, and will not be discussed here. The primary lesson to take from a 
comparison of Tables 8 and 9 is that whereas a large number of socio-economic 
effects are apparent for contribution behaviour, these are conspicuous through their 
absence for male (but not for female) allocation behaviour. If it is reasonable to 
assume that the variables  used are orthogonal  to response to scrutiny in the 
experiments, then this remarkable contrast confirms our suspicion that the external 
validity of contribution decisions is greater than that of allocation decisions. Put 
differently, since socio-economic variables predict the former to a greater extent than 
the latter, we are more reasonably confident that the former correspond with 
analogous every-day decision making than that the latter do. At the same time, there 
is an intriguing suggestion here that male response to scrutiny in the experiments is 
17 External validity may also be affected by the representativeness of the sample. When we correct for 
sample selection bias, results do not change in any meaningful way. When we correct for this bias in 
game behaviour regressions on socio-economic characteristics following Heckman’s approach to 
correct for self-selection, coefficients hardly change and the inverse Mills ratio is not significant 
(although it comes close to significance in one specification; p = 0.111.)
18 Diagnostic tests for multicollinearity, omitted variable bias and heteroscedasticity indicate the 
existence of only the last-mentioned. We use tobit regressions with robust standard errors to mitigate 
this problem.
3greater than that of females.19
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
Specifically, overall and spousal contributions are, ceteris paribus, between 10 
and 23 percent  lower   in Bufumbo  than  in  Sironko;   the difference   is  always 
statistically significant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one reason for the inter-site 
difference may be the less cooperative marital arrangements in Bufumbo than in more 
placid Sironko, possibly rooted in the sex-segregated (Bufumbo) rather than sex-
sequential (Sironko) nature of agricultural practices (see Section 4). We tested this 
(not reported here) by interacting a “both are farmers” dummy with a site dummy, 
and also by running regressions separately for each site, and obtained limited but not 
conclusive support for this hypothesis.20 Table 8 also suggests that, for reasons not 
known   to   us,   spousal   or   own   education   and   occupation   significantly   affect 
contribution behaviour in various ways; female teachers are particularly cooperative. 
Where spouses have the same occupation or (more pronounced so) education, 
contribution   rates   tend   to   rise,   although   the   effect   is   not   always   statistically 
significant, and never very large (7 percent at most). Some limited support is thus 
19 This is consistent with Cecile Jackson’s (2008) interpretation of male behaviour in our experiments 
based on her observation of the games and follow-up interviews: men more than women engaged in 
“display behaviour” designed to impress the experimenters.
20 Note further that since individual games are controlled for in Table 8, the significance of the site 
dummy is not likely due to the fact that only some of the variants played in Sironko were played in 
Bufumbo. Indeed, variant-specific regressions (not reported here) if anything exacerbate the difference 
between sites.
3obtained for the hypothesis that assortative matching improves household efficiency 
(Becker 1991). The statistically strongest effect is found for the age of the husband: 
both wives and husbands contribute less to the common pool when husbands are 
older. By contrast, husbands contribute more the older they are than their wives, 
which may hint at a marriage market effect.21
The point of the econometric exercise is not so much to be able to explain 
game behaviour using contextual variables but rather to get a sense of the presence of 
socio-economic  effects   in  contribution   and   allocation  regressions.   Unlike  their 
abundant   presence   in   contribution   regressions,   no   socio-economic   effects   are 
significant in the male allocation regressions (Table 9). By contrast, women ceteris 
paribus reward male contributions more generously in Bufumbo [sic] and when their 
husbands are older (irrespective of their own age), and less generously when they are 
married to farmers and when they are younger than their husbands. 
A similarly measured assessment of correspondence between normal life and 
allocation behaviour in the games derives from 36 follow-up interviews. Such 
behaviour in the games does reflect the identity of the person with overall control of 
the household budget, at least when wives are asked to identify this person (Table 10). 
When according to wives their husbands have such control in their homes, they 
receive about 60 percent of the common pool in the games, wives 40 percent; the 
21 The age of the wife could not be included separately because of multicollinearity.
3situation is almost exactly symmetrical when wives (again in their own judgment) 
have such control. In both cases, the difference in receipts between husbands and 
wives is statistically significant. Husbands’ views on the same matter are not 
correlated with allocation behaviour in the games, which is intriguing and may reflect 
the reluctance of some to admit that their wives hold the purse-strings. In any event, 
we obtain some suggestive evidence here that game allocation behaviour, although far 
from predictable using contextual variables, nonetheless mirrors roughly analogous 
real-life behaviour.22
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
7. Conclusion
To sum up: although surplus maximization is the most common outcome in 
the experiment the majority of partners do not contribute their full endowment to the 
common pool, which repudiates unitary and cooperative models. In Bufumbo no 
couple   achieves   the   maximum   available   surplus.   We   find   clear   evidence   of 
opportunism and that, contrary to the predictions of standard bargaining models, 
having control of the allocation reduces the payoff. On the other hand, limited support 
for bargaining models is obtained in that higher endowment does lead to higher 
payoffs; but there is a noted gendered difference in whether this prediction holds or 
not, with (conditional on control) male but not female receipts increasing in the level 
22 Further support for this claim is that in the follow-up interviews (with 51 couples), 56 percent of 
women and 92 percent of men said the way they shared money in the game was similar to everyday 
practice.
3of endowments. A finding that no household model we are aware of would predict is 
that there is evidence that female control leads to greater contribution for both sexes. 
Finally, we find no evidence of women being intrinsically more inclined to contribute 
to the common pool than men, nor that their contributions are undervalued by men, 
which casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990).
We have devoted some of the analysis to the external validity of these 
findings. The greater presence of socio-economic effects that we find in contribution 
than in allocation regressions is consistent with the hypothesis introduced in Section 3 
that subjects’ response to scrutiny in the experiments would exert a larger influence 
on allocation decisions, and thereby limit their external validity to a greater extent. As 
expected, we are on safer grounds when examining contribution behaviour, although 
the final part of the analysis in Section 6 clearly hints at some correspondence with 
normal life also for allocation behaviour. To the extent, then, that our experimental 
findings can be generalised to the real world of couples’ cooperation and sharing and 
lack thereof, it is obvious that no single model can accommodate the diverse evidence 
reported here. As far as theories of the household are concerned, one size does clearly 
not fit all.
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4Table 1. Variants of the game played.
Endowment to woman (given 
total endowment of 4000) ↓









2000 3, 8 4 5, 9
4000 6 7
(Numbers in bold denote variants played in Bufumbo)
4Table 2. Predictions.
Null Hypothesis Formal statement. Reversible
I. Total surplus is maximized xi = Ei No
II. Household efficiency is independent of the identity of allocator x1+x2 is identical under male and female control No
III. Control does not raise payoff share zi / y no higher with control Yes
IV. Endowment does not raise net payoff Ei - xi + zi does not rise with Ei Yes
V.  No contribution-based sharing zi / y does not increase in xi Yes
VI. No undervaluation of female contributions zi / y increases equally in xi for female and male Yes
VII. Women do not contribute more to the common pool xi no higher for i = female No
VIII. No opportunism Ei - xi = 0 No
Note: Games 1 (50:50) and 2 (F) are male-only, 6 (M) and 7 (50:50) female-only, and 3&8 (M), 4 (50:50), 5&9 (F) equal endowment games, where F 
denotes female control, M male control and 50:50 an equal split of the common pool. Variants 8 and 9 are played in Bufumbo, all others in Sironko.





























































25 0.676 0.596 2436 2860 0.639 0.188
-9.608
0.000***
240 0.788 0.790 2978 2605
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level
M denotes male control, F female control, and {FE} female endowments in thousands of shillings 
(male endowments are 4000 minus FE)
Note: Following Godfrey (1988) and Moffat and Peters (2001), the p-values reported and critical 
values used for this test are for a 2 sided test even though the test itself is one-sided. This is 
because the null is on the boundary of the possible parameter distribution (i.e. efficiency cannot be greater than 1).
4Table 4. Control of the allocation and total contribution levels.
Comparison Variant N Mean y/max 
y
Std. Deviation T statistic
p value
50:50 split (first variant) versus control by an individual (second variant). 
1 {0} 1 26 0.904 0.201 -0.794
2 (F) 25 0.940 0.109 0.431
2 {2} 4 30 0.769 0.255 -0.781
3 (M) 27 0.718 0.242 0.438
3 {2} 4 30 0.769 0.255 -1.204
5 (F) 25 0.845 0.202 0.234
4 {4} 7 32 0.887 0.189 -1.072
6 (M) 26 0.833 0.193 0.288
Control by husband (first variant) versus control by wife (second variant).
Comparison Variant N Mean y/max 
y
Std. Deviation T statistic
p value
1 {2} 3 (M) 27 0.718 0.242 -2.054**
5 (F) 25 0.845 0.202 0.045
2 {2} 8 (M) 24 0.534 0.199 -1.910*
9 (F) 25 0.639 0.188 0.065
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test
M denotes male control, F female control, and {FE} female endowments in thousands of shillings 
(male endowments are 4000 minus FE)
4Table 5. Control, individual contribution levels and payoffs.












1 {2} Female  3 (M) 27 1296 -1.863* 0.570 3122
  5 (F) 25 1584 0.068 0.491 2832
2 {2} Male  3 (M) 27 1574 -1.708* 0.430 2318
  5 (F) 25 1800 0.094 0.509 2860
Bufumbo
3 {2} Female  8 (M) 24 1021 -2.97*** 0.523 2675
  9 (F) 25 1352 0.005 0.458 2436
4 {2} Male  8 (M) 24 1117 -0.602 0.477 2458
  9 (F) 25 1204 0.550 0.542 2860
Sironko
5 {4} Female  6 (M) 26 3331 - 0.800***  4554***
   {0} 2 (F) 25 - - 0.420 2532
6 {4} Male  6 (M) 26 - - 0.200*** 1119***
   {0} 2 (F) 25 3760 - 0.580 3348
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test
*** indicates significant at 1% level, 2 tailed test
M denotes male control, F female control, and {FE} female endowments in thousands of 
4shillings (male endowments are 4000 minus FE)
5Table 6. Evidence on reciprocity in 6 variants.






R2 Slope = 0? Slope = 1?
Sironko































‘No’ =hypothesis rejected at 95% level; ‘Yes’ = hypothesis not rejected at 95% level.
{FE} denotes female endowments in thousands of shillings (male endowments are 4000 
minus FE)






1 Male  1 {0} 26 3615 0.614
Female 7 {4} 32 3547
2 Male  4 {2} 30 1567 0.552
Female 4 {2} 30 1510
p-values from a 2-tailed t-test with unequal variances
{FE} denotes female endowments in thousands of shillings (male endowments are 4000 
minus FE)
5Table 8: Tobit estimates of contribution rates on socio-economic characteristics of spouses (with robust standard errors)
Variables Pooled Husbands Wives
Coefficient  Robust se dy/dx Coefficient Robust se dy/dx Coefficient Robust se dy/dx
Bufumbo -0.248*** 0.061 -0.136 -0.486*** 0.093 -0.235 -0.162** 0.069 -0.100
Husband-farmer -0.005 0.060 -0.003 0.034 0.089 0.017 -0.041 0.072 -0.026
Wife-farmer 0.038 0.059 0.021 0.029*** 0.088 0.014 0.062 0.070 0.039
Husband-teacher 0.009 0.115 0.005 0.042 0.232 0.020 0.062 0.138 0.038
Wife-teacher 0.548*** 0.214 0.301 2.559 0.156 1.237 0.496* 0.262 0.307
Same occupation 0.086 0.055 0.047 0.078 0.085 0.038 0.121* 0.063 0.075
Husband-educated 0.011 0.056 0.006 -0.029 0.082 -0.014 0.075 0.069 0.046
Wife-educated 0.001 0.054 0.000 0.054 0.074 0.026 -0.032 0.064 -0.020
Same education 0.105** 0.046 0.058 0.145** 0.072 0.070 0.047 0.053 0.029
(log) Husband age -0.184** 0.088 -0.101 -0.247* 0.133 -0.119 -0.195* 0.109 -0.121
Age difference 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.011** 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.004 -0.000
Constant 1.605*** 0.343 1.809*** 0.495 1.493*** 0.411
No of observations 240   182   189  
LR chi2 105.450   86.910   66.890  
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000  
Note: Contribution rates are measured as contribution to the common pool divided by the initial endowment; dy/dx are the unconditional marginal effects; 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level; game dummies are included but not reported. 
5Table 9: Tobit estimates of allocation rates on socio-economic characteristics of spouses 
(with robust standard errors)
Male allocation (female receipts 
divided by female contribution)
Female allocation (male receipts 
divided by male contribution)
Variables Coefficient  Robust se dy/dx Coefficient Robust se dy/dx
Bufumbo 0.490 0.336 0.464 0.925*** 0.208 0.903
Husband-farmer 0.108 0.335 0.101 -0.473* 0.244 -0.462
Wife-farmer -0.328 0.339 -0.310 -0.096 0.244 -0.094
Husband-teacher 0.231 0.587 0.219 0.124 0.280 0.121
Wife-teacher -0.505 0.532 -0.457 0.224 0.351 0.220
Same occupation 0.069 0.240 0.064 0.022 0.224 0.021
Husband-educated -0.198 0.370 -0.187 0.011 0.287 0.010
Wife-educated -0.012 0.500 -0.011 -0.078 0.212 -0.076
Same education -0.005 0.239 -0.005 0.086 0.194 0.084
(log) Husband age -0.308 0.570 -0.289 1.016** 0.420 0.988
Age difference -0.012 0.018 -0.011 -0.035** 0.016 -0.034
Constant 3.039 2.299 -1.927 1.523
No of observations 76 75
LR chi2 5.78 26.90
Prob > chi2 0.888 0.005
Note: Allocation rates are measured as receipts from the common pool divided by 
contributions to the common pool; dy/dx are the unconditional marginal effects; *** 1% 
significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. Game dummies are 
included but not reported.Table 10: Male and female share from common pool and household money management
Wives responses









Husband 16 0.603 0.049
Wife 20 0.429 0.043
2.408 0.022
Wives’ share Husband 16 0.396 0.053





Husband 17 0.511 0.059
Wife 19 0.501 0.051
0.122 0.904
Wives’ share Husband 17 0.491 0.059
Wife 19 0.517 0.067
-0.286 0.777
 Note: “Husband/wife mainly in charge of household money” condenses five forms of budget 
control identified in the follow-up interviews: wife keeps all money, husband requests for 
personal use (1); wife keeps most money, husband retains for personal use (2); husband keeps 
all money, wife requests for household and personal use (3); husband keeps most money and 
gives wife an allowance (4); husband keeps all money and does all purchasing (5). Female 
overall budget control corresponds with categories 1 and 2, male with 3, 4 and 5.
5 Figure 1. Proportion of total surplus realised in each of the games.
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   1 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 t o t a l 0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   2 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 2 4 6 8 1 0 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   3
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 3 6 9 1 2 1 5 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   4 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   5 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   6
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   7 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   8 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 T o t a l 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 F r e q u e n c y V a r i a n t   9


































































































































2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
M
a
l
e
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
G
a
m
e
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
05